René's URL Explorer Experiment

{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"DiscussionForumPosting","headline":"[Hardening] F-15: Failure to Block Abusers by IPs.","articleBody":"### The required feature described as a wish\n\n**Description:** CloudStack does not monitor or restrict API authentication attempts based on the source IP address. A single client can submit unlimited failed authentication attempts across any number of accounts without being identified or blocked.\n\n**Affected Components:** Management API\n\n**Impact:** An attacker operating from a single source address can systematically target multiple user accounts with repeated failed login attempts, deliberately triggering lockouts across all accounts, preventing legitimate users and administrators from accessing the platform.\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n- Using a custom script or a brute-forcing tool (e.g., `hydra`), send a high volume of failed authentication attempts targeting multiple user accounts.\n- Observe that the requests are processed without any source IP tracking, flagging, or blocking.\n- Confirm that targeted accounts transition to a disabled state while the source IP remains unrestricted.\n\n**Recommended Remediation:** Log all authentication attempts and source IPs to `/var/log/cloudstack/management/auth.log` so tools like Fail2Ban can automatically detect brute-force attacks and block malicious traffic (via `iptables` or `nftables`). For even faster protection, a system administrator can craft a custom script using `inotify` to trigger real-time blocks via network edge appliances, stopping attackers' traffic before they ever reach CloudStack.","author":{"url":"https://github.com/davift","@type":"Person","name":"davift"},"datePublished":"2026-06-04T01:07:52.000Z","interactionStatistic":{"@type":"InteractionCounter","interactionType":"https://schema.org/CommentAction","userInteractionCount":0},"url":"https://github.com/13343/cloudstack/issues/13343"}