René's URL Explorer Experiment

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    "@graph": [
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        "@type": "Organization",
        "@id": "https://agentrust-io.com/#organization",
        "name": "AgenTrust",
        "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/",
        "description": "Open specifications and verifiers for the AI supply chain: model weights, agent identity, tool calls and delegation, bound to hardware attestation and checkable offline.",
        "sameAs": [
          "https://www.linkedin.com/company/agentrust-io/",
          "https://github.com/agentrust-io",
          "https://trace.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://manifest.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://cmcp.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://ca2a.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://wcm.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://tests.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://governance.agentrust-io.com",
          "https://github.com/agentrust-io/agentrust-telemetry"
        ]
      },
      {
        "@type": "WebSite",
        "@id": "https://agentrust-io.com/#website",
        "name": "AgenTrust",
        "url": "https://agentrust-io.com/",
        "publisher": {
          "@id": "https://agentrust-io.com/#organization"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
  

  {
    "@context": "https://schema.org",
    "@type": "ItemList",
    "name": "AgenTrust open specifications",
    "itemListElement": [
      {
        "@type": "ListItem",
        "position": 1,
        "item": {
          "@type": "TechArticle",
          "name": "Weight Custody Manifest (WCM)",
          "headline": "Weight Custody Manifest (WCM)",
          "url": "https://wcm.agentrust-io.com/",
          "description": "An open, pre-1.0 specification that binds model-weight identity and custody terms to key-release policy when a builder deploys weights into infrastructure it does not control."
        }
      },
      {
        "@type": "ListItem",
        "position": 2,
        "item": {
          "@type": "TechArticle",
          "name": "Agent Manifest",
          "headline": "Agent Manifest",
          "url": "https://manifest.agentrust-io.com/",
          "description": "A structured, machine-readable declaration of an agent's capabilities, permissions, and data access policies that operators and orchestrators can verify before invocation."
        }
      },
      {
        "@type": "ListItem",
        "position": 3,
        "item": {
          "@type": "TechArticle",
          "name": "Confidential MCP (cMCP)",
          "headline": "Confidential MCP (cMCP)",
          "url": "https://cmcp.agentrust-io.com/",
          "description": "Confidential MCP (cMCP) evaluates routed MCP tool calls against policy and records the decisions. In a hardware deployment, the runtime is inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE); the agent and upstream tool server remain separate. Host confidentiality also depends on the egress policy. Software mode provides no hardware isolation."
        }
      },
      {
        "@type": "ListItem",
        "position": 4,
        "item": {
          "@type": "TechArticle",
          "name": "Confidential A2A (cA2A)",
          "headline": "Confidential A2A (cA2A)",
          "url": "https://ca2a.agentrust-io.com/",
          "description": "A trust profile on the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol that makes agent-to-agent delegation verifiable and confidential: attested, attenuated delegation, a sealed peer channel, and an offline-verifiable provenance record for every hop."
        }
      },
      {
        "@type": "ListItem",
        "position": 5,
        "item": {
          "@type": "TechArticle",
          "name": "TRACE",
          "headline": "TRACE",
          "url": "https://trace.agentrust-io.com/",
          "description": "TRACE defines portable, signed runtime evidence. Hardware provenance requires attestation verification against a trusted root; software-mode records do not provide that guarantee."
        }
      }
    ]
  }